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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
The succession instability quandary 
President Putin and his government are widely credited with bringing stability to 
Russia, especially in contrast to the chaos of the Yel'tsin years.  In many ways, 
Russia is significantly more stable without the political clashes between executive 
and legislative power centers that marred Yel'tsin's first term, and absent the 
kompromat and media/oligarch wars that marked his second term.  Certainly, the 
presence of a young, healthy leader in the Kremlin has imparted a more robust 
air to Russian political life. 
 
The drawbacks of the Putin regime's authoritarian stability, including the 
emasculation of legislative authority and restrictions on media freedoms, are 
evident and well noted.   There is one strand of the chaos of the Yel'tsin era—a 
strand traceable throughout Russian history—that Putin has continued and 
perhaps exacerbated:  the succession quandary. 
 
While Putin repeatedly asserts his intention to leave his presidential post at the 
end of his term in 2008, there are countervailing signs that he might be 
persuaded to stay.  Bearing in mind the state's prominent role in the media, 
particularly television, recent commentators have ratcheted up their coverage of, 
and justifications for, a third Putin presidential term across a range of media:  
Moscow News provided a survey of attitudes toward the presumed successors, 
Sergei Ivanov and Dmitri Medvedev, along with Putin's opinion poll numbers and 
concluded that "the chances that Putin will remain for a third term will continue to 
grow with each week." (1)  Writers for the online version of Gazeta.ru 
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extrapolated from comments made by Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov ("Vladimir 
Putin will fulfill the duties of president up until May, at the very least") that Gryzlov 
did not  rule out "the possibility of the prospect of the infamous "third term" for 
Putin." (2)  On radio, Gleb Pavlovsky, while discussing the personnel shuffle that 
landed Sergei Ivanov in a co-equal position to Dmitri Medvedev, told Ekho 
Moskvy that "Fradkov, Medvedev and Ivanov are all important, but Putin is the 
chief.  And whatever he is called, and whatever position he holds, he will 
continue in this position." (3)  On NTV Mir, a panel, including former 
Nezavisimaya gazeta founder Vitali Tretyakov and program host Vladimir 
Solovyev discussed the succession, with Tretyakov concluding that "A committee 
is to be founded for nominating Putin for the third term, for an appropriate 
procedure for the third term. His consent has to be obtained first of all." (4) 
 
More disturbingly, coverage of even the poorly-attended opposition protest in St. 
Petersburg last weekend (where the once respected former Prime Minister 
Mikhail Kasianov teamed up in a coalition, "The Other Russia," with National 
Bolshevik leader Eduard Limonov  and United Civil Front head Garry Kasparov to 
sponsor the event) resulted in the dismissal of a noted journalist.  (5)  Russkoye 
Radio correspondent Irina Vorobyeva appeared on Yevgenia Albats' program, 
Polnyy Albats on Ekho Moskvy, and reported on the St. Petersburg rally of 
approximately 5,000 protestors.  Apparently, when Vorobyev called her own 
station to report on the event, she was informed by her superiors that Russkoye 
Radio would not be covering the event.  When they discovered she had 
appeared on the Albats program to discuss the event, Vorobyev says, "I was 
sacked because I had been disloyal to the radio station." (6) 
 
Vorobyev may consider herself lucky that her job was all that was lost.  The 
recent spate of murders of journalists, and last week's death of Kommersant 
correspondent Ivan Safronov, raise the question of why Russia has become such 
a dangerous place for journalists.  The answer may lie in the paradox of Putin's 
succession signals. 
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The president continues, on the one hand, to reiterate his intention to step down 
and, in moves reminiscent of Yel'tsin's trademark personnel shifts, places trusted 
associates in official positions that suggest they are being primed as successors.  
On the other hand, Putin allows, perhaps even promotes, discussion of a contra-
constitutional third term.  The result is extreme uncertainty in what 2008 will 
produce for Russia's political elite.  It also heightens apparat rivalry, which 
operates in a particularly volatile environment, as potential successors vie for 
advantage, but not so overtly as to offend the president, should he choose to 
exercise his third term option. 
 
This rivalry, evident nearly from the beginning of Putin's term, and perhaps first 
noted in the battle that eventually produced Vladimir Ustinov as Procurator-
General in 2000, (7) continues in political attacks between the so-called "liberal' 
and hard line factions within the government.  Prime Minister Fradkov, evidently 
sensing (not necessarily accurately) an upswing in his status, has launched an 
attack on the Health and Social Development Minister Mikhail Zurabov by first 
dismissing one of Zurabov's associates, the head of the Health Inspectorate, 
Ramil Khabriyev. (8)  Fradkov's intention to pursue Zurabov was made clear in 
the Cabinet meeting earlier this week, as he criticized the management of health 
services.  In remarks that Fradkov might do well to note, Putin's comments at the 
same meeting suggested the Prime Minister should look more closely before he 
attacks Zurabov: "Dealing with personnel problems is fine and necessary, but if 
we do not deal with production issues, we cannot solve the problem." (9) 
 
The shifting sands of this succession, even if it ends without a presidential 
succession at all, provide dangerous ground for both the political players and the 
journalists who cover their public moves and private finances.  A successful 
candidate for the presidency will have to muster the political goodwill of Putin, 
maintain a prominent profile through the media, manage a long and regionally 
diverse patronage tail, and marshal significant financial resources.  While the 
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contenders are in a perilously unstable "campaign" for the presidency, those 
journalists who cover any aspect of their careers may find themselves in peril, as 
well. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) "Countdown to the Vote—What People are Saying," by Anna Arutunyan, 
Moscow News, No 8, 2 Mar 07 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(2) Gazeta.ru website, 22 Feb 07 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(3) Russian TV and Radio Highlights, 12-18 February 2007, BBC Monitoring 20 
Feb 07 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(4) "Sunday Night with Vladimir Solovyev," Russian NTV Mir, 1900 GMT, 18 Feb 
07; Financial Times Information, BBC Monitoring International Reports via Lexis-
Nexis Academic.  For more on Tretyakov's remarks, please see The ISCIP 
Analyst, Executive Branch, 22 Feb 07. 
(5) "Those who disagree march in Petersburg," By Andrei Kozenko and Mikhail 
Shevchuk, Kommersant, No.34, 5 Mar 07; Russica Izvestiya Information/Russian 
Press Digest via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(6) Ekho Moskvy, 0500 GMT, 7 Mar 07; Financial Times Information/BBC 
Monitoring International Reports via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(7) "'Family' Beats our Rivals in Cabinet," by Simon Saradzhyan, The Moscow 
Times, No. 1961, 20 May 00 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(8) "Top Health Inspector Dismissed," by Tai Adelaja, The Moscow Times, 6 Mar 
07 via http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/ 2007/03/06/04.html accessed: 6 
Mar 07. 
(9) Ibid., citing a RIA-Novosti source. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
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By Robyn Angley 
 
Kadyrov-Putin alliance yields stability for Russia? 
Ramzan Kadyrov has assumed the post of president of Chechnya officially. His 
confirmation followed the procedure established shortly after the Beslan terrorist 
attacks, whereby the presidential representative for the respective region—in this 
case, Dmitri Kozak—presents Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin with 
at least two prospective candidates to be selected as head of the region. Once 
Putin has announced his choice, the appointment then is confirmed by the 
regional legislature, which can be dissolved if it rejects Putin's candidate more 
than three consecutive times. No such political high-handedness was necessary 
for the Kadyrov appointment. 
 
Kozak proposed three presidential candidates: Kadyrov; First Deputy Chief of the 
Chechen presidential and governmental office and United Russia Chechen 
organization Head Muslim Khuchiyev; and Grozny district Administration Head 
Shakhid Dzhamaldayev. The latter two men clearly were space fillers on the 
proposal list. 
 
As speaker of the Chechen legislature’s lower house, Dukuvakha 
Abdurakhmanov said, “I am expressing not only my personal opinion, but the 
opinion of an overwhelming majority of the republican population that there is no 
alternative to Kadyrov. His merits before the republic in the restoration of 
economy and the social sphere, in establishing peace and stability in Chechnya 
are great.” (1) 
 
Putin nominated Kadyrov on March 1; Kadyrov was confirmed by the regional 
parliament, most of whose members owe their positions to Kadyrov, on March 2. 
(Kadyrov is a member of Chechnya’s United Russia’s political council and head 
of United Russia's Chechen branch, a post he will be allowed to retain even with 
his recent promotion. Many of the region’s legislators belong to that party.) The 
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confirmation was broadcast on Chechen television accompanied by scenes of 
crowds celebrating the appointment in Grozny Square. (2) 
 
Kadyrov's appointment marks a signal defeat for the siloviki, many of whom 
supported former president Alu Alkhanov, particularly for his tractability. 
Opponents to Kadyrov's advancement included GRU officials, senior military 
personnel, and key members of the Duma. (3)  Another important adversary was 
Putin's Deputy Chief of Staff Igor Sechin, an influential member of the siloviki 
contingent within the state apparatus. 
 
The confirmation of Kadyrov's new position has elicited various responses in the 
Russian media. Some view Kadyrov's appointment as a sign of progress and a 
signal that the war in Chechnya is, at long last, over. For instance, Kadyrov was 
described by The Moscow News as “a guarantor that Chechnya is finally on its 
way to order and stability.” (4)  
 
Some analysts have speculated that Kadyrov is the latest pawn in a power game 
meant to perpetuate Vladimir Putin's dominance in the political arena. As one 
article put it, “In preparing to appoint Ramzan Kadyrov as president of Chechnya, 
Vladimir Putin is ensuring that his own influence on Russian politics will continue 
after 2008. Without Putin, Kadyrov would become another Dudayev. Only Putin 
can guarantee that there won't be another war in Chechnya.” (5)  (After all, would 
there have been the Second Chechen War without Putin?) Perhaps the recent 
personnel changes permit Kadyrov to position himself as an almost messianic 
leader of Chechnya, while allowing Putin to solidify his image as the only leader 
who can promise stability in Chechnya (and, by extension, Russia) because of 
his personal relationship with Kadyrov. 
 
Kadyrov, who has used the recent and much-lauded amnesty programs to beef 
up his own security forces, is a risky bet for stability. His troops, and many 
members of the region's governing bodies, are loyal to Kadyrov as a person, 
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rather than to the government as an entity. The Kremlin has put all its money on 
Kadyrov, who is willing work with the Kremlin—for the present, at least—but will 
not be controlled by it.   
 
Kadyrov's tenure as Chechen president, however long it may be, will be marked 
by stability at costly terms for the Kremlin. Already, during his short stint as acting 
president, Kadyrov has proposed that Chechnya surrender its long-held demand 
for a treaty outlining division of powers between Moscow and Grozny in 
exchange for Chechen control of the region’s oil sector. (6) 
 
As for the protection of human rights in Chechnya, based on past performance, 
Kadyrov probably will set political stability as a much higher priority. Chechen 
television recently aired a report covering Council of Europe Human Rights 
Commissioner Thomas Hammarberg’s visit to Kadyrov’s residence while he was 
in Chechnya for a human rights conference. Typically, the report mentioned only 
Hammarburg’s comments about the reconstruction of Chechnya and failed to 
mention any of his criticism of Kadyrov for permitting prisoners to be tortured. (7)  
However, the report did mention abuses carried out by “federal military and 
security agencies,” carefully avoiding placing any blame on the region’s over-
lauded hero and, at the time, acting president. (8) 
 
The conference was boycotted by many prominent human rights organizations to 
protest Kadyrov’s recent rise in power within the region. Although the conference 
was shunned by Memorial, the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society, Amnesty 
International, and the Moscow Helsinki Group, Putin’s human rights advisor Ella 
Pamfilova was scheduled to be present. Indeed, given Putin’s unswerving 
support for Kadyrov despite consistent opposition, it would have been highly 
unusual for Pamfilova not to attend. 
 
Kadyrov sent a message to the conference by way of chief of the presidential 
and government administration, Abdulkakhir Izrayilov, in which he stated that he 
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would make a priority of searching for people who had been abducted in 
Chechnya (especially, according to the message, those who had disappeared 
between the years of 1999 and 2001), in addition to addressing the issue of 
individuals displaced by the region’s protracted conflict. (9)   
 
Kadyrov's efforts to give Chechnya's human rights situation a facelift 
demonstrate an awareness of the pressure the Kremlin has received from 
international bodies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) about the 
situation there. Sadly, these cosmetic changes are merely the stage mask of an 
authoritarian, if extremely charismatic, personality. 
 
Source Notes:  
 
(1) “Chechen speaker says no alternative to Kadyrov,” 1 Mar 07, TASS via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(2) “Chechen’s celebrate new president’s endorsement,” 1120 gmt, 2 Mar 07, 
GTRK Vaynakh TV, Groznyy, in Chechen; BBC Monitoring via Lexis Nexis. 
(3) Olga Allenova, “Insurance against the successor,” 26 Feb-4 Mar 07, 
Kommersant-Vlast; WPS via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) Anna Arutunyan, “Chechnya stage set with Kadyrov’s appointment,” Moscow 
News, 23 Feb 07 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(5) Olga Allenova, ibid. See also Aleksei Malashenko, “Carte blanche—Russian 
pundit views new Chechen presidency,” 26 Feb 07, Nezavisimaya gazeta via 
Lexis-Nexis; Anna Arutunyan, ibid. 
(6) “Ramzan: No alternatives,” 26 Feb 07, Nezavisimaya gazeta-regiony; What 
the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) David Nowak, “Chechnya blasts boycotting NGOs,” 1 Mar 07, The Moscow 
Times via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) “European rights commissioner praises changes in Chechnya,” 1750 gmt, 27 
Feb 07, GTRK Vaynakh TV, Groznyy, in Russian; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-
Nexis. 
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(9) “Chechen acting president vows to solve human rights problems,” 1 Mar 07, 
Caucasus Times website; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Politkovskaya murder update: It was the Chechens…honest!! 
On 7 October 2006, as she was returning to her Moscow apartment, Anna 
Politkovskaya was killed in classic execution style, receiving gunshot wounds to 
the head and chest. (1)  Politkovskaya’s death was not wholly unexpected. Her 
reports on the Chechen war were extremely controversial. Politkovskaya did not 
shy from criticizing and questioning the official Kremlin line, nor from condemning 
loyalist Chechen forces. According to her editor at Novaya gazeta, she had been 
close to submitting a report on torture in Chechnya that could have proved 
extremely damaging to the government. Moreover, in what surely was no 
coincidence, her murder took place on President Vladimir Putin’s birthday. 
    
The investigation into her death last fall focused on several former OMON 
officers, specifically Sergei Lapin, who currently is imprisoned in Chechnya for 
war crimes. (2)  
 
During the last few weeks, attention apparently has shifted from Lapin and his 
colleagues to possible Chechen assassins. Early in February 2007, 
Komsomolskaya pravda, a “pro-Kremlin” newspaper, claimed that “analysis of 
photographs from military satellites taken on the day of the murder,” allowed 
authorities to identify, track and arrest two Chechen individuals. (3)  
    
This report evidently was met with such skepticism that Komsomolskaya pravda 
followed up with an interview with Nikolai Volkov, a “former Space Forces 
Intelligence Officer,” who confirmed that Russia had this satellite capability, 
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claiming that “the capabilities of space intelligence in the most advanced 
countries develop virtually ‘nostril to nostril.’” These nations, he intimated, are 
able to photograph “a tennis ball from space.” (4)  Technological capabilities 
aside, a number of other questions arise from this claim. Why was a strategic spy 
satellite over Moscow, conveniently, at the time of Politkovskaya’s murder? Is it 
possible that the asset was in fact being used to track Politkovskaya, in order to 
provide up-to-the minute-intelligenceto her killers? Finally, the radical shift in 
focus of the murder investigation bears examination. Why has the center of 
investigation shifted from rogue, disillusioned ex-security officers to Chechens? 
Cui Bono?  
    
There are several possible conclusions to these questions. First, colleagues of 
Aleksandr Litvinenko, the FSB defector killed in London during the winter, have 
claimed that he was murdered in part due to his investigation into Politkovskaya’s 
death. Litvinenko, it is claimed, knew who killed Politkovskaya and was planning 
to expose the perpetrators. (5)  If Moscow can “prove” that the latter was killed by 
Chechens, Litvinenko’s information could be portrayed as tainted, and by 
extension, the alleged link between the murders evaporates.  Secondly, the 
“Chechen connection” may be used to “re-legitimize” Russia’s involvement in that 
Republic. In the ultimate irony, Politkovskaya may be portrayed as Russia’s 
martyr and her death used to trumpet “security concerns” in the run-up to 
Russia’s State and Duma elections, due to be held later this year. 
 
FSB strikes again—wag the dog? 
On 22 February, the FSB announced that several individuals from Dagestan, 
who were attempting to smuggle assault rifles, handguns, silencers, ammunition 
and cash into Moscow had been arrested. (6) Several days later the agency 
claimed to have prevented a putative suicide bombing from taking place in 
Moscow. Apparently, Farid Magomedov, a resident of Makhachkala, was 
arrested on a bus traveling towards a metro station. He allegedly was carrying an 
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“improvised mine” made of buckshot and nails, and his pocket contained the 
remote detonator. (7)  
    
These reports may be true. On the other hand, the individuals traveling to 
Moscow may have been veterans of the Chechen war engaged in weapons 
smuggling – a not unknown phenomenon. Equally, in the light of Putin’s directive 
to the FSB last month that the agency should guarantee Russia’s security during 
elections, (8) they may be instances of “wag the dog.” 
 
Litvinenko update: Lugovoi, Berezovsky interviewed 
There are two countervailing theories regarding the murder of FSB Defector 
Aleksandr Litvinenko. According to the Kremlin's theory, Boris Berezovsky, the 
exiled oligarch and opponent of President Putin, ordered Litvinenko’s murder.  
This theory holds that Berezovsky wanted to have Litvinenko killed as part of a 
“political” operation, designed to influence British judges, so that they would 
refuse Moscow’s continued extradition efforts vis à vis Berezovsky. (11) 
    
In contrast, Litvinenko’s colleagues and friends maintain that he was killed in 
order to silence him. Specifically, they allege that he had discovered the identities 
of Anna Politkovskaya’s killers and was preparing to unveil them. (10)  
Litvinenko, according to this theory, was killed because of his betrayal of Mother 
Russia.  
    
The Scotland Yard investigation into the murder was completed several weeks 
ago, when the detectives working on the case passed their dossier to the Crown 
Prosecution Service. Newspaper reports indicated that Andrei Lugovoi, a former 
KGB and FSB officer was their prime suspect, and that authorities would seek to 
begin extradition proceedings. (11) 
 
In the last few weeks, both Berezovsky and Lugovoi have participated in several 
interviews, in which each has endeavored to present their version of events. 
 12 
    
Berezovsky gave two interviews (to RFE/RL on 7 February, and Ekho Moskvy 
Radio on 23 February). In both sessions, he maintained that Litvinenko himself 
had suspected that Lugovoi administered the poison. (12)  He also claimed that 
he was willing to meet Russian detectives in London in order to be questioned 
about Litvinenko. In an obvious publicity stunt, Berezovsky also personally 
offered to finance the “most expensive of lawyers,” to represent Lugovoi, if he 
agreed to face charges in the UK. (13) 
    
Lugovoi’s interviews focused on his denial of involvement. The former KGB agent 
claimed that he had spoken with Berezovsky personally, in order to deny any 
involvement, (14) stated flatly that he was being “hounded” by the media, and 
finally, that he had received no requests from British police to come to London. 
Such a request, he hinted, might be entertained under the right circumstances. 
(15)  Most interestingly, Lugovoi claimed he had his own theory on the murder, 
but could not discuss it due to a non-disclosure agreement signed at the behest 
of the Prosecutor General’s office. (16)  
    
Finally, in a move that may have been designed as a diplomatic “ratcheting-up” 
of pressure, Britain’s ambassador to Moscow, Sir Anthony Brenton, conducted 
interviews with Ekho Moskvy and the BBC on successive days, in which he 
claimed that “talks” on cooperation over the case would start “soon.” (17)  
Brenton also insisted that British authorities wanted “to catch the person who 
committed this crime and see them punished…if that involves extraditing 
someone from Russia, then we will try to achieve that.” (18)  
    
At this juncture, an “extradition permit” from the Kremlin seems highly unlikely. If 
handed over, Lugovoi could lose any motivation for maintaining silence. Yet one 
wonders what concessions the Kremlin will try to exact from Britain in return for 
Lugovoi, if not the “reciprocal” return of Berezovsky.  
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Source Notes: 
 
(1) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIII, Number 3 (19 Oct 06). 
(2) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIII, Number 4 (9 Nov 06). 
(3) “Two Held For Politkovskaya Death,” The Sunday Telegraph, 11 Feb 06 via 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/02/11/wchech11.xml.  
(4) “Former Space Forces Intelligence Officer On Spy Satellites Capabilities,” 
Komsomolskaya pravda, 15 Feb 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(5) “Russian Security Service Ex-Staffer Quizzed In Politkovskaya Murder Case,” 
Ekho Moskvy Radio Moscow in Russian, 15 Nov 06; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(6) “North Caucasus Arms Intercepted On Way To Moscow—FSB,” ITAR-TASS, 
22 Feb 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) “Terrorist Bombing Prevented In Russia, Suspect Detained—Moscow Police,” 
RIA Novosti, 26 Feb 06; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(8) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIII, Number 8 (22 Feb 07).  
(9) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XII, Number 5 (7 Dec 06). 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIII, Number 8 (22 Feb 07).  
(12) “Berezovsky Breaks Silence On Litvinenko,” RFE/RL, 7 Feb 07; The Sunday 
Times via Lexis-Nexis.  
(13) Ibid.  
(14) “Andrei Lugovoi: Why Should I Drop Everything And Rush Over To 
England?” What The Papers Say, 27 Feb 07; Izvestia via Lexis-Nexis.  
(15) “Key Witness In Litvinenko Murder Gives Interview To Russian Radio,” Ekho 
Moskvy Radio, Moscow, in Russian, 23 Feb 07; Financial Times Information, 
BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis 
(16) Ibid.  
(17) “Russian Radio Interviews UK Envoy,” Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow, in 
Russian, 23 Feb 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(18) “Litvinenko Inquiry Nearing End—UK Ambassador To Russia,” ITAR-TASS, 
24 Feb 07; Financial Times Information, BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces (Internal) 
By Monty Perry 
 
Who is Serdyukov? 
Russian Defense Ministry officials and senior military officers are scratching their 
collective heads at President Putin’s choice of replacement for Sergei Ivanov in 
the position of Defense Minister.  While the decision to raise Ivanov to the same 
rank as Medvedev didn’t come as much of a surprise, naming the former director 
of the Russian Federal Tax Service, Anatoly Serdyukov, as his replacement 
caught many off guard.   
      
The transfer of Ivanov to First Deputy Prime Minister appears to be aimed at 
accomplishing a couple of political objectives.  First, leaving the Defense Ministry 
will distance him from the stigma associated with numerous problems in the 
military. (1)  As one of the possible Putin successors in 2008, it may be best for 
Ivanov to leave the problems of low pay, poor housing, scandalous conscript 
abuse, and budget misappropriations, to name just a few, to someone else.  
Additionally, in his new position, Ivanov is now on equal ground with his apparent 
rival for the presidential succession, Dmitri Medvedev.  In positions of equal rank, 
the two front-runners can now spend the next year demonstrating their potential 
to succeed Putin. (2) 
      
The unexpected appointment of Serdyukov to lead the Defense Ministry has 
enraged some and bewildered many.  A quick look at his past experience reveals 
virtually no military experience beyond his mandatory two-year conscription.  
After satisfying his military obligation, Serdyukov attended the Leningrad Institute 
of Commerce, where he studied economics. (3)  Upon graduation, he worked for 
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the next 15 years in the furniture business, where he progressed through 
numerous management levels and eventually became General Director of the St. 
Petersburg Furniture Market. (4)  In 2000, the same year in which he completed 
his Ph.D. in economics, he was appointed to the number two position within St. 
Petersburg’s branch of the Federal Tax Service. (5)  It was in this position that 
Serdyukov began to develop his reputation as a tough leader who could get 
things done.  He rose through the ranks of the Tax Ministry, and in 2004 became 
the Tax Minister and then Director of the Federal Tax Service; he followed in the 
footsteps of a mentor named Viktor Zubkov who is a member of Putin’s inner 
circle. (6)  This relationship is thought to constitute a significant contribution to 
Serdyukov’s most recent appointment.  Another link to Putin can be traced to 
Serdyukov’s close friendship with the President’s Deputy Chief of Staff and 
former KGB colleague Viktor Ivanov. (7)   
      
In typical Putin fashion, knowledge of Serdyukov’s appointment as Defense 
Minister was kept from the military community until the formal announcement 
was made.  In fact, when Putin did make the announcement and introduced 
Serdyukov during a recent session of the Defense Ministry collegium, many of 
the military elite in attendance didn’t even recognize him. (8)  In anticipation of 
what would constitute immediate concern over Serdyukov’s total lack of 
experience in security or law enforcement, Putin claimed that “In today’s 
circumstances, organizing the work that entails spending vast amounts of state 
funding requires a person with some experience in the economic field.” (9)   
      
While Sergei Ivanov’s departure from the Defense Ministry was publicly 
honorable, his failure to make progress in reforming the military also may have 
contributed to his removal.  The rise in world oil prices and Russia’s resulting 
economic windfall over the past several years has served to quadruple the 
defense budget.  What was a budget of $8.2B in 2001, when Ivanov took control 
of the Defense Ministry, grew to $31.3B in 2007. (10)  However, even with the 
bulging budget coffers, modernization efforts, weapons acquisition programs, 
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and attempts at social reform have proven extremely disappointing.  Ivan 
Safranchuk, an analyst with the Russian Center for Defense Information said 
“Bureaucratic logic tells Russian leadership that corruption and fraud are the 
main reason for the poor progress.” (11)  According to Anatoli Tsyganok, director 
of Russia’s Military Forecasting Center, “one of the first officials to be dismissed 
[under the new leadership] might be Liubov Kudelina, head of the Defense 
Ministry’s Economics and Finance Service [who] has been unable to explain to 
President Putin where the money is going. (12)   
      
Notwithstanding Putin’s initial reasoning behind appointing Serdyukov to his new 
post, the military elite still seems unconvinced.  Jokes still circulate saying that at 
best “the former furniture salesman will be able to supply the barracks with new 
tables and chairs.” (13)  Even though actively serving senior officers are not 
saying much on the record, anonymously they are appalled at the move.  During 
a radio interview, retired Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, Vice President of the 
Academy of Geopolitical Problems, said the appointment is a “spit in the face” 
and the “humiliation of the Army and all servicemen.” (14)  The military elite does 
not seem to place much trust in Putin’s explanation of a new and clearer 
delineation of responsibilities between the General Staff and the Defense 
Ministry.  Under Yuri Baluyevsky, the General Staff supposedly now will assume 
much more of the responsibility for military operations while the Defense Ministry 
will focus on overseeing all financial management aspects of the military. (15)   
      
Despite widespread frustration over the appointment of a second consecutive 
“civilian” to lead the military, Serdyukov may prove capable of accomplishing 
some things Ivanov couldn’t.  Unlike his predecessor, one of the facts Serdyukov 
is said to be proud of is that throughout his entire time with the Federal Tax 
Service, he never gave an interview to the print media. (16)  This tendency to 
avoid the limelight may be viewed as a welcome change and serve to quiet what 
has been outspoken and unwelcome criticism of the military. (17)  He will be 
judged by his ability to execute existing programs efficiently, rather than 
 17 
developing and advertising new reforms.  Making rapid strides in reforming and 
modernizing the military may provide another political benefit:  with military 
personnel and defense workers comprising a significant proportion of all voters in 
national elections, visible improvements for troops could help to ensure a smooth 
transition of power in 2008. (18) 
      
One thing is certain, and important to understand.  With his appointment of 
Serdyukov, President Putin has shown again that he is in ultimate control of the 
military. (19)  He remains the one true decision-maker and will finish his term, not 
as a lame duck, but in a position of unchallenged authority.    
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces (External) 
By Daniel DeBree 
 
Two birds with one stone          
Russia's Chief of the General Staff Yuri Baluyevsky created a commotion in the 
international community two weeks ago, when he stated that Russia may 
withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, in 
response to the deployment of US missile defense components in Eastern 
Europe. (1)  He is not the first to make this assertion, since former Russian 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov also called continued compliance with the INF 
treaty into question, stating that it was a “relic of the Cold War.” (2)  Although a 
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small number of Russian military analysts agree with this assessment, the large 
majority considers abrogating the treaty to be a foolish move that ultimately 
would hurt Russian national security. (3)  So what are the motives behind the 
Russian military leadership's actions – is this an idle threat or is there more than 
meets the eye? 
 
The genesis of the INF treaty began in the early 1980s with the deployment of 
Soviet SS-20 and US Pershing ballistic missiles to Warsaw Pact and Western 
European countries, respectively.  Both of these nuclear missile systems were 
classed as “intermediate range,” with an average operational range of 1,000-
5,500 kilometers.  This resulted in what was a significant military disadvantage 
for the Soviet Union, with US nuclear missiles being able to reach Moscow in 
less than ten minutes.  With no significant defense against this threat, the 
situation gave the US the hypothetical ability to launch a disabling first strike from 
Western Europe. This situation was viewed as unacceptable from the Soviet 
standpoint. (4)  
 
The result: seven years of negotiation and the signing of the INF treaty in 1987.  
It was the first treaty between the US and the USSR that eliminated entire 
classes of nuclear weapons – both intermediate and short range (500-1,000 km) 
nuclear missiles.  Ultimately, the Soviets destroyed more than twice as many 
missiles as the US, with 1,846 Russian missiles being destroyed and 846 
American ones meeting the same fate.  All of this was completed by 1991. (5)  
The treaty has an indefinite timeline and both the US and Russia have continued 
to observe it.  There is a clause in the treaty, however, which allows either 
participant to withdraw (with six months notice) if it has “convincing proof” that its 
security is sufficiently threatened to necessitate the deployment and production 
of such systems once again. (6) 
 
So what would necessitate a Russian withdrawal from this treaty?  Although it is 
not very recent, the biggest change may have been the US withdrawal from the 
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Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty in 2001.  This, in turn, cleared the way for a US 
missile defense system, part of which is now planned for deployment in Poland 
and the Czech Republic.  Ostensibly, it is a threat to Russian national security 
from this US defense shield in Eastern Europe that warrants a withdrawal from 
INF. 
 
In an interview last week, General Baluyevsky explained the threat as such: 
“Knowing the potential technical specifications…under certain circumstances, 
they could have some influence on our deterrence arsenals.”  This highly 
qualified statement certainly seems to describe a much less serious threat than 
one that would require immediate deployment of Russian intermediate range 
nuclear missiles. (7)  In fact, as many Russian analysts have pointed out, the 
situation has not changed at all since the 1980s; it remains primarily a question 
of geography.  The US has the luxury of being protected by two wide oceans, 
while Russia does not.  
 
In reality, the situation would be significantly worse for Russia if the US were to 
deploy (non-defensive) nuclear missiles to its NATO partners, as the reaction 
time would be cut in half, assuming the missiles were placed in the Baltic States 
and Poland. (8)  Exacerbating the situation even further, any intermediate 
ballistic missile production would most likely come at the expense of new ICBM 
production, as the Russian plant used to produce nuclear warheads chronically 
misses production goals. (9)  Ultimately, scrapping the INF treaty could result in a 
significantly increased ability for the US to launch a debilitating first strike on 
Russia, without any increase in Russia’s ability to strike the US directly.  In fact, 
the scenario would be significantly worse than the situation the treaty was 
designed to eliminate! 
 
Quite possibly, though, it is not Russia’s western border that the generals are 
worried about, but its borders to the south and southeast.  As Ivanov very 
candidly pointed out, Russia and the US are the only signatories to the INF treaty 
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– many other countries have developed and deployed intermediate range 
missiles, including Pakistan, India, and especially China.  China has quite a 
number of these missiles, with many of them presumably aimed at Russia, but 
Russia has no commensurate ability to counter them.  Unless Russia is able to 
convince China and other INF-equipped countries to sign the treaty (which has 
not yet been proposed),  then there is at least some significant benefit to pulling 
out of the treaty.  In effect, Russia has had its “convincing evidence” for quite 
some time – in China, not the US. (10) 
 
In addition to countering a significant INF threat from China, withdrawing from the 
INF treaty also could serve a second purpose: to focus European attention on the 
proposed US missile defense system.  By threatening to scrap the treaty, Russia 
implies that it will deploy short range nuclear missiles to target US systems in 
Europe.  Once again, Europe will have to confront the idea of becoming a 
nuclear battleground.  At a minimum, this could cause the Polish and Czech 
populations to object to the US deployment.  Moreover, it could cause Western 
European powers to attempt to intervene in what is now a bi-lateral discussion 
between the US and its Eastern European partners, as they too would be subject 
to Russian targeting. (11)  In essence, Russian intentions could be very similar to 
Soviet aims back in the 1980s – to split the US and its European allies.  
 
Ultimately, however, it is most probable that Russia will withdraw from the INF 
Treaty, and will deploy intermediate range nuclear weapons –not on its European 
borders but on its southern frontiers.  If, by withdrawing from the treaty, Russian 
military leaders are able to sabotage US plans for missile defense in Eastern 
Europe, then they get an extra bird for their one stone.  But it would be truly 
foolhardy to give the US an excuse to put offensive nuclear weapons in Europe 
once again, and to end more than twenty years of relative security due to the 
significant concessions made under the INF treaty in the first place. 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Alexey Dynkin 
 
Trade vs. territory in the Far East 
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov arrived in Tokyo on 27 February for an 
official two-day visit designed to promote bilateral relations between Russia and 
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Japan. Referring to the long-standing territorial dispute between the two 
countries over the four southern islands of the Kuril archipelago, Fradkov 
essentially urged the Japanese to move on and forget about reclaiming the 
islands, stating that “this [territorial] issue must not be a source of contention," 
and that "a solution must develop as we advance to new levels of cooperation, 
primarily in trade and economic relations." (1)  He thus placed the burden of 
overcoming the dispute on the Japanese, adding that it is Japanese public 
opinion which makes Russo-Japanese relations contingent upon a resolution of 
the dispute. (2)  Fradkov's implication is that popular emotion, rather than sober 
national interest, is behind Japan’s continued official insistence on the return of 
the southern Kurils; this theme also surfaced in reports that described increased 
security measures in preparation for Fradkov’s visit as designed to prevent 
“extreme nationalist” groups from staging “vociferous anti-Russian actions.” (3)  
To extend this logic, the only obstacle to full bilateral relations is the political 
necessity of Japan's government to consider Japanese public opinion; thus, not 
only is Russia presented as the mature and rational player in the dispute, but the 
point of contention can be by-passed, if only Japanese public opinion could be 
muted. 
 
A recent Russian analysis takes the position that the territorial dispute has 
become all but a formality, and that bilateral relations already have been fully 
developed, at least in the economic sphere. (4)  One reason for such perceptions 
may be recent statements from Tokyo that hint at a possible willingness to accept 
a compromise in return for a final settlement. In December 2006, Japanese 
Foreign Minister Taro Aso made a proposal to partition the territories in question, 
including actually splitting one of the islands—Itorofu—with Russia. (5)  While the 
proposal never turned into an official offer, it nonetheless appears to have been 
perceived by the Russian side as a significant concession, as well as a more 
general policy shift related to the ousting of the conservative government of 
Koizumi. 
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The lack of a permanent peace settlement between Russia and Japan is due to 
the absence of the Soviet Union from the 1951 San Francisco Treaty between 
Japan and the Allied Powers. In fact, according to Section C, Article 2, Chapter II 
of the treaty, “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and 
to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan 
acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 
September 1905.” (6)  The basis of the Japanese claim to the four southern 
islands lies in a treaty signed between the Russian Empire and Japan in 1855 
called the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation, 
according to which the boundary between Russian and Japanese interests in the 
archipelago was drawn between Iturop (Iturofo) and Uruppu. Regardless of the 
validity of this claim from the Japanese perspective, or of the Soviet occupation 
of Japanese territory in the first place (as Japan had not once violated the 
neutrality agreement it had signed with the Soviet Union in 1941), from the Soviet 
perspective, the failure of the USSR to sign the San Francisco Treaty allowed, on 
one hand, for Japan to make whatever territorial claims it deemed “just” in return 
for a settlement, and, on the other hand, for the Soviet Union to continue its 
occupation of all the territory it had seized without technically being in violation of 
any agreement it had signed. 
 
The idea of a partition, in fact, has been in the works since 1956, and was first 
proposed not by Japan, but by the Soviet Union, which offered to return to Japan 
two of the smaller islands in question—Shikotan and Hamobai, which lie just off 
the coast of Hokkaido and which Japan claims are not even part of the Kuril 
chain—in return for a permanent peace settlement. At that point, the reward for 
Soviet withdrawal from the two small islands would have been Japanese 
acceptance of its seizure of the rest of the islands. During the Cold War, with 
Japan a member of the Western alliance, there was little incentive either for 
Japan to accept the proposal or for the USSR to offer any more concessions. As 
a result, the 1956 declaration did not lead to any positive change in the status of 
the islands. 
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The collapse of the USSR presented an opportunity for the development of 
mutually beneficial relations between Japan and Russia and these relations have 
progressed considerably in the economic sphere. In 2005, Japan ranked fourth 
among countries from which Russia imports goods, with a total of 6% of all 
imports. (7) At the same time, it is noteworthy that despite Russia’s enormous 
petroleum and gas reserves (which Putin has called the key to Russia’s re-
emergence as a world power) and its relative proximity to Japan, Japan 
continues to rely mainly on Australia and on the Persian Gulf states to meet its 
energy needs – both of which require tanker transport over long distances. 
Indeed, the lack of any major category of imports from Russia to Japan casts 
doubt as to how far relations between the two really have developed. 
 
Beyond economic opportunities, however, a settlement of the Kuril dispute could 
offer an opportunity for a strategic partnership, or even an alliance. From the 
Russian perspective, this could prove very useful in the long term should its 
current relationship with China take a turn for the worse as China’s influence in 
the region grows. More broadly, post-Cold War Japan qualifies as one of the 
world’s independent power centers, according to Primakov’s theory of multi-
polarity. That being so, Fradkov’s most recent visit demonstrates scant 
enthusiasm on the Russian side for offering anything in the way of concessions 
on the status of the islands. The message coming from Moscow is that the ball is 
in Japan’s court as far as the territorial dispute is concerned. Russia may be able 
to benefit from increased bilateral ties without having to give anything, if the new 
Japanese government decides that trade relations with Russia are more 
important than national pride. The construction of a strategic partnership is 
unlikely however, without a permanent settlement. As Moscow turns inward for 
the constitutionally –scheduled presidential succession, there seems scant 
reason to expect controversial territorial concessions will be offered to Japan to 
cement relations. Finally, while the Kuril dispute is a long-standing issue in 
Russian foreign relations, at the moment it appears relatively low on the list of 
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priorities in comparison to the Middle East, US ABM sites in Eastern Europe, and 
contentious disputes within the “Near Abroad.” Thus, unless there is considerable 
initiative, along with a willingness to compromise on the part of the Japanese 
side, a final settlement of the Kuril dispute is unlikely in the near future. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway joins, divides the Caucasus  
On February 7, Georgian President Saakashvili welcomed President Ilham Aliyev 
of Azerbaijan, and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Tbilisi for a 
trilateral summit on strengthening regional cooperation. The meeting was 
crowned by the commission of a railway line running from Kars to Baku, via 
Tbilisi. The railway will service a cargo capacity of 20 million tons per year and 
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provide a trans-Caucasian transport corridor as a complement to the trans-
Caucasian oil and gas pipelines already in operation. Construction of the project 
is slated to begin in June 2007, with completion expected sometime in 2009. 
Cost estimates for the project run from $422 to $600 million. (1) 
 
Ambitions for the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku (KTB) railway stretch beyond the Caucasus 
region and entail geo-strategic dimensions; Turkish press reports hailed the 
“historic” project as a new Silk Road that will someday link China to Europe via 
the Caucasus. (2) As envisioned by its signatories, the railway will provide a link 
uniting the Chinese railway system in the east to Western Europe by way of 
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey (perhaps including ferry service 
across the Caspian). When the railway is completed, Turkish Weekly reported, a 
passenger will be able to travel by train from London to China non-stop. (3) 
Initially, however, the line will transport petroleum products, with passenger 
service added at an undetermined future date. 
 
Us and them  
The project’s stated aim is to intensify and expand cooperation among Turkey, 
Georgia and Azerbaijan by joining the countries’ railway networks. (4) The 
cooperative rhetoric, however, obscures the contentious debates that shape 
transport schemes in the region. While the railway network will work to unite the 
transportation and communication infrastructures of the three countries, it will, by 
the same measure, push Armenia further into isolation, depriving the landlocked 
country of its historical role as a transit route for north-south and east-west trade. 
Already struggling to cope with blockades imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey, 
Armenia was an indirect victim of Russian sanctions leveled against Georgia in 
2006, when its export corridors effectively were sealed off at the Georgian-
Russian border. 
 
The KTB railway project is not a new idea. A proposal for the same route was put 
forward by Turkey in 1993, only to face opposition in the West, where the 
 28 
European Commission and the US Congress finally moved to block funding for 
the project in 2005, following a sustained lobbying campaign from Armenian 
groups. In its present incarnation, the railway will be an exercise in regional self-
reliance, financed by revenues from the sale of oil and gas flowing through the 
BTC and South Caucasus pipelines. Azerbaijan has agreed to provide $200 
million in investment capital to Georgia on generous terms (1% annual interest 
rate, to be paid back over the course of the next 25 years) to cover its leg of the 
project. (5) 
 
Armenian authorities claim that the railway will formalize Ankara’s blockade of 
the country and remove the impetus from ongoing negotiations to reopen the 
border. They point to the already existing east-west railway corridor connecting 
Kars and Gyumri as a more economically sound alternative to the large-scale 
construction of an entirely new railway. The Kars-Gyumri line was closed down 
by Ankara in 1993, in retaliation for Armenia’s seizure of territory in Azerbaijan. 
The sustained support of Turkey for Azerbaijan in the wake of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict underlines the dense interconnection of issues that cause 
tension within the entire region. The decision to bypass Armenia was not an 
inadvertent development, but a strategic political slight delivered by Azerbaijan 
and Turkey. Armenia will be kept out of the project, President Ilham Aliyev 
maintains, pending the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. “Until 
Armenia liberates the occupied Azerbaijani territories, all transportation projects 
will bypass the country,” Aliyev said in a statement delivered 22 January. (6)             
 
Recognizing the hostile political message of the new railway corridor, U.S. and 
E.U. support for the project has been ambivalent. “If Azerbaijan, Turkey and 
Georgia decide to go ahead with this railroad we are not opposing it at all, but we 
are not promoting it actively,” commented US Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Matthew Bryza. “We’d love to get to that 
point when the railroad from Turkey to Baku could transit Armenia,” however, he 
added, “that’s not our decision. We are not investors.” (7) 
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Important for all three countries involved in the construction is the autonomy 
afforded by self-financing a major project. Regional cooperation has allowed 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to proceed with the KTB project where 
international political will was lacking. It also highlights the economic, political and 
strategic interests of the three countries, both positive and negative. The railway 
promises to increase the geo-strategic position of Turkey, as the country that 
joins Europe to the petroleum channels flowing from the east; the same is true for 
Azerbaijan, which, as an oil and gas producer, is widely supposed to be the 
primary beneficiary of the export corridor. In addition to a robust economic boost 
for the Caspian Sea port in Baku, the country’s national railroad company, which 
will garner tariffs from the new line, will also win. Strategic interests will be served 
by the project as well: “For the first time, Azerbaijan will get direct railroad access 
to its most important ally, Turkey,” explained political analyst Rasim Musabekov. 
(8)  Georgia initially was hesitant to sign on to the KTB railway, put off by the 
prohibitively high cost of the project. However, following Russia’s blockade of the 
country in 2006, the Georgian government reconsidered. Georgian Economic 
Development Minister Giorgi Arveladze cited the importance of a transportation 
corridor that circumvents Russian territory, when he commented on his country’s 
participation in the railway. “We have to support this project amidst the economic 
blockade of Georgia from the North,” he explained. (9)  While gaining an export 
route is Georgia’s primary objective, the railway may also serve to transform the 
country’s role in the region into an important transportation hub for east-west 
flows. 
 
As Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan prepare to launch their transportation 
independence, collectively, they would do well to consider the consequences for 
Armenia. By excluding Armenia from a regional transport scheme, it will make 
the prospect of a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict less likely and 
cause the isolated country to deepen its ties with external actors, such as Russia 
and Iran, to meet its economic and security needs. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Kyrgyzstan’s ex-prime minister rejoins opposition, calls for early elections 
Feliks Kulov, Kyrgyzstan’s former Prime Minister, left office on 29 January (1) 
and not long thereafter traveled to Moscow for “a number of meetings and 
consultations,” according to a statement released by the Ar-Namys (Dignity) 
Party (opposition party founded by Kulov).  It was not specified with whom he 
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would be meeting, or what the topics of his various “consultations” might be.  
Upon his return from Moscow, the statement said, Mr. Kulov would be willing to 
address questions submitted to him on-line. (2) 
 
On 14 February, Kulov held his first press conference, since exiting his post as 
prime minister, during which he proceeded to dispel any notions that he might 
continue working with President Kurmanbek Bakiev’s government, announcing 
instead that he had rejoined the opposition.  The former premier was ambiguous 
about which opposition group he would be working with, stating that his goal was 
not to support just one party, but “to unite and head various public and political 
bodies, those who long for positive changes in the country, want to work for the 
society and not to serve separate political figures and groups.” (3)  Mr. Kulov 
warned that such threats as resurgent organized crime, a political elite divided 
along regional lines, groups trying to seize state property for themselves, and a 
television media controlled mainly by one family (he did not specify which family, 
but it is well-known that the Bakiev family owns a number of media outlets) pose 
a serious danger to Kyrgyz citizens and that in the face of such threats, he can 
not sit idly by, but must fight to protect his people and bring about positive 
change in the government. (4) 
 
Just a few days later, Kulov announced the formation of a new political 
movement, the United Front for a Worthy Future for Kyrgyzstan, which includes 
the Ar-Namys Party, (5) as well as Omurbek Tekebaev’s Za Reformy! (For 
Reforms!) movement. (6)   According to the movement’s own statement of 
purpose, it has been created as a temporary entity, which will disband once its 
goals have been met.  Its two main stated goals are constitutional reform and the 
holding of early presidential elections, and judging by its harsh criticism of 
President Bakiev, one also might assume that the President's removal from office 
ranks as the United Front’s foremost aim.  While Kulov refrained, for the most 
part, from blaming Bakiev directly for the country’s troubles in his press 
conference, the United Front statement pulls no punches, accusing the president 
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of abusing his power by seizing state property for himself and his family, 
pressuring businesses and the media to do his bidding, and stymieing the 
process of constitutional reform. (7)  Thus far, there is no indication that the date 
of the presidential elections will be moved up, but if Kulov succeeds in garnering 
enough support from the rest of the opposition, Bakiev may have to begin taking 
the United Front’s demands seriously.  The question, of course, is whether or not 
the ex-premier will be able to win over those opposition politicians whom he 
alienated, and in some cases, severely castigated, during his tenure in the 
“tandem” with Bakiev.  The opposition was already rife with internal divisions and 
Kulov’s formation of yet another new political movement may only splinter the 
opposition parties further.  A number of Jogorku Kengesh deputies and 
opposition leaders have given their support publicly to the United Front: MP’s 
Kubatbek Baibolov, Omurbek Tekebaev, Kabai Karabekov, and Melis 
Eshimkanov, former Minister of Internal Affairs Omurbek Subanaliev, Deputy 
Chairman of the Ata-Meken Party Duishen Chotonov, Green Party Chair Erkin 
Bulekbaev, leader of the German Diaspora in Kyrgyzstan Valeriy Dil and 
coordinator of Za Reformy! Omurbek Abdrakmanov all signed the new 
movement’s statement of purpose.  However, such prominent figures as Roza 
Otunbaeva and MP Bolot Sherniazov have not yet lent their support to Kulov’s 
movement. (8) 
 
The former prime minister has managed to win encouragement from an unlikely 
source, namely former president Askar Akaev, who praised Kulov while attending 
a gathering at the Moscow Carnegie Center on 14 February, calling his actions 
“responsible and brave.”  There has been speculation that Kulov met with Akaev 
during his trip to Moscow, most likely in order to seek backing for his new political 
venture. (9)  It seems that Kyrgyz domestic politics have come almost full circle – 
Akaev’s former foe, Feliks Kulov, is now accusing his former ally, Kurmanbek 
Bakiev, of committing the same transgressions for which Akaev was ousted, 
while simultaneously seeking the support of the ex-president and the anti-
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Akaev/now anti-Bakiev opposition – the old adage “the more things change, the 
more they stay the same” has never rung more true. 
 
There do still seem to be cooler heads in the Kyrgyz opposition – Jogorku 
Kengesh deputy Bolot Sherniazov criticized Kulov and his supporters for focusing 
their efforts on yet another presidential personnel change, rather than working 
toward a change in the system of government, (10) and he is quite right – a 
revolving door of presidential personalities is likely to create only further political 
instability and the Kyrgyz government will continue to founder as a result. 
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MOLDOVA 
The battle over “peacekeepers” 
 What are “peacekeepers?”  According to the United Nations, which sanctions 
and/or deploys the vast majority of “peacekeeping operations” in the world, they 
are “soldiers and military officers, police and civilian personnel from many 
countries [who] monitor and observe peace processes that emerge in post-
conflict situations and assist conflicting parties to implement the peace 
agreement they have signed.” (1) 
 
Peacekeeping Operations are sanctioned by a vote of the UN Security Council, 
with the consent of the country or countries that would allow peacekeeping 
troops on their territory.  The troops are multinational, and are either deployed 
directly from the UN or from regional groups authorized to oversee the operation 
by the UN (for example, the African Union, NATO or the EU).  (2) 
 
On 4 March, Igor Smirnov, the self-styled leader of Moldova’s breakaway 
republic of Transnistria, lashed out at suggestions that Russian “peacekeepers” 
be removed from the separatist republic.  “The Russian peacekeepers have been 
helping to preserve peace in the Dniester region for 15 years now,” he said. He 
went on to thank Russia for its “assistance” and praise his region’s “historical, 
cultural and economic ties” with Moscow.  (3) 
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These statements follow earlier suggestions from Smirnov that his region should 
become part of Russia (a suggestion favored by “voters” last year in a highly 
questionable public referendum), and repeated private meetings with Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov outside the settlement process to determine 
Transnistria’s status.  
 
Most recently, Smirnov and Lavrov discussed methods for “lowering the level of 
confrontation between Chisinau and Tiraspol,” according to the Russian Foreign 
Ministry. (4)  Just days before this meeting, Smirnov declined to take part in a 
new round of negotiations to determine Transnistria’s final status.    
 
The negotiations would have been the first such meeting in over a year, and 
would have included Transnistria, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE as 
well as the EU and US as observers.  Just days before the scheduled talks, 
Smirnov claimed that Moldova had instituted a “policy of pressure” by 
implementing tougher customs regulations for Transnistria last year and 
suggested that this pressure made talks impossible. (5)  He chose to leave for 
Moscow, instead of discussing this issue in negotiations.   
 
As negotiations drag on, the separatist conflict remains frozen, which so far has 
worked to Smirnov’s advantage.  There are now approximately 1,500 Russian 
troops, labeled peacekeepers, in Transnistria.  The troops have been cited by 
organizations like Human Rights Watch for their lack of impartiality.  
 
In late 2005, the Association for the Bar of the City of New York (ABCNY) 
conducted the most comprehensive examination ever done of the legal situation 
in Transnistria.  After dozens of interviews (including with Smirnov and numerous 
officials in Transnistria, as well as with Russian representatives in Moldova and 
the US), the organization severely criticized the actions of Russian troops –  
officially the Russian 14th Army, formerly the Soviet Union’s 14th Army.    
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The ABCNY wrote:  “The Russian 14th Army played a decisive role in the 1992 
War by intervening in the fighting on behalf of the separatists. Despite treaty 
promises to demobilize and repeated Moldovan requests that Russia remove its 
troops from Transnistria, the troops remain. Consequently, they prop up the 
viability of the TMR [Transnistria-Moldovan Republic] and make reintegration 
more difficult. They also provide materiel, expertise, and other support to the 
TMR on an ongoing basis.” (6) 
 
Smirnov and the Russian media repeatedly refer to these troops by using the 
nickname for UN forces, “blue helmets.”  But, these troops are clearly not UN 
peacekeepers.  This mission was not sanctioned by the UN; it consists of one 
country’s forces, and it does not have the consent of both parties involved in the 
conflict.  As noted above, Moldova repeatedly has demanded that the troops 
leave its territory – most recently in December. (7) 
 
Smirnov’s latest statement of support for Russian troops came amid new 
attempts by Moldova and its neighbors to create an alternative peacekeeping 
operation.  It appears that Ukraine and Georgia have recommitted themselves to 
finding support for UN-recognized regional peacekeeping forces in former Soviet 
republics grappling with separatism.  
 
The idea for regional peacekeepers first surfaced officially last year at the summit 
of the GUAM regional organization (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova).  
At this summit, leaders of the four countries announced plans to form a 
peacekeeping contingent for possible deployment to Transnistria, the Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia separatist republics in Georgia and the Karabakh area in 
Azerbaijan.   The leaders also announced plans to invite the EU’s participation.  
 
The idea appeared to have quickly drowned in Ukraine’s domestic political crises 
and Georgia’s confrontations with Russia. But in early February, it resurfaced at 
the Munich Conference on Security Policy, when Ukraine President Viktor 
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Yushchenko underscored his country’s continuing commitment to regional 
peacekeeping and apparently discussed the issue extensively on the sidelines of 
the event.  During a state visit to Georgia on 27 February, Yushchenko again 
reiterated his support for Ukrainian peacekeepers as part of internationally-
mandated forces in GUAM countries.  (8)  
 
One week after the Munich conference, following a meeting with Georgian 
President Mikheil Saakashvili in Brussels, EU foreign policy head Javier Solana 
suggested that the EU was “ready to help Georgia and participate in such an 
operation [peacekeeping], if necessary.”  However, he noted that "Any 
peacekeeping missions should have precise and achievable goals.”  (9)    
 
In early March, Solana may have gone even further, apparently suggesting that 
the EU would be open to the idea of joint peacekeeping operations with Russia in 
Eastern/Central European trouble spots.  In an unattributed article on 5 March, 
German news magazine Der Spiegel explained, “According to Solana, this could 
mean Russian-European peacekeeping missions for example in Kosovo, but also 
in Moldova, where Russian troops are currently deployed in the renegade 
province of Transnistriya [sic]. Moscow has responded very positively to this idea 
in private circles.”  (10)  Solana’s direct comments are not quoted and are not 
available elsewhere.  Neither he nor anyone in the EU has confirmed that this 
idea is even under discussion. 
 
The plan undoubtedly would be welcomed by Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, 
which have long complained about the lack of impartiality of Russian troops.  But, 
the possibility that Smirnov (or other separatist leaders, for that matter) would 
agree is distant at best.   
 
While in Moscow recently, Smirnov met with the self-styled leaders of all former 
Soviet separatist republics, and together, the men began formulating a response 
to renewed suggestions that Russian peacekeepers should be withdrawn.  The 
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leaders affirmed their intention to create their own peacekeeping force and set up 
a joint information center in Moscow.  (11) 
 
One day after returning to Transnistria from Moscow, Smirnov claimed that his 
region has a “battleworthy army,” and is “ready to repel any threats.”  He 
continued, “Only Russian soldiers can provide peace and security on the banks 
of the Dniestr river [Transnistria].”  (12)   
 
Smirnov again declined to explain why he viewed a multi-national force as a 
danger.  In the past, he has suggested that any change will bring instability.  
“Why does everyone want to replace the peacekeepers?” he asked in November 
2006.  “I said to the British lady ambassador, ‘Like you, I am conservative, and … 
if something works it should not be broken and thrown away'.” (13) 
 
Moldova, of course, would disagree.  While Moldova certainly has far to go in its 
reform process, Transnistria hasn’t yet begun and is almost entirely dependent 
on Russian aid.  Moreover, as the ABCNY found, “The TMR has had a poor 
human rights record including a lack of due process, persecution of religious 
minorities, and retaliation against political dissenters.” (14)  There is no free 
press and the region has been identified by the EU as a “black hole” of 
smuggling.  
 
But despite this rhetoric, Transnistrian authorities do not seem overly concerned 
about the prospect of Russian troops leaving.   Following his meetings with 
Russian officials, the nominal Transnistrian Foreign Minister said he had been 
told that, despite talks with the EU, “no decisions or changes are expected.”  (15)   
Most importantly, Russia has shown no willingness to accept the “loss” of the 
territory that its military controls in Transnistria. 
 
Should these latest signs of potential progress come to naught, it would be 
unsurprising, given the history of Western involvement in the Transnistrian 
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conflict.  Repeatedly, when confronted with Russian intransigence on the troops 
issue, the West—primarily in the form of the EU and OSCE—has backed down, 
or has been unable to find the consensus to move forward.  In the process, 15 
years have passed, with Russian troops, labeled as “peacekeepers,” holding the 
same territory they held while Mikhail Gorbachev was in power. 
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